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Abstract
We present a model of incomplete information games with sets of priors.U p o n
arrival of private information, each player “updates” by the Bayes rule each of pri-
ors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece of
information. Then the player uses a possibly proper subset of this set of posteriors
to form beliefs about the opponents’ strategic choices. And ﬁnally the player evalu-
ates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs ` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). So each player’s preferences may exhibit non-linearity in probabilities which
can be interpreted as the player’s aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. In this setup,
we deﬁne a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and
demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the environment
aﬀect the strategic outcomes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We present a model of incomplete information games with multiple priors. More specif-
ically, our model is the same as the standard Bayesian games of incomplete information
except for one point: instead of a prior over the states, we assume that there is a set of
priors. Upon arrival of private information, each player “updates” by the Bayes rule each
of priors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece
of information. Then the player uses a possibly proper subset of this set of posteriors
to form beliefs about the opponents’ strategic choices. And ﬁnally the player evaluates
his actions by the most pessimistic belief ` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). So each
player’s preferences may exhibit non-linearity in probabilities which can be interpreted as
the player’s aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty.
In this setup, we deﬁne a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results
for them, and demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the
environment aﬀect the strategic outcomes. Not only the aversion to uncertainty matters
in a player’s own decision making, but also it has strategic eﬀects on the other players’
strategic decision making.
Our model is simple and very tractable since it is a minimal departure from the stan-
dard Bayesian approach for the games of incomplete information. On the other hand, our
model is rich enough to capture important aspects of incomplete information games, and
distinguish the two key ingredients of incomplete information: lack of information about
payoﬀs and ambiguity about them.
To appreciate our contribution, let us start with a brief review of the standard ap-
proach. By deﬁnition, a game of incomplete information is a description of strategic
environment where players do not necessarily know some of the important parameters
of the environment, such as payoﬀs. Harsanyi (1967—68) advocated the approach of rep-
resenting incomplete information games by Bayesian games with imperfect information,
which is now the standard approach.
For our purpose, Harsanyi’s points can be summarized into the following two points.
The ﬁrst point is that the source of uncertainty can be expressed by an underlying state
space, and the incompleteness can be reduced to diﬀerence of private information among
the players. The reason is that if there is any ambiguity about the fundamental speciﬁ-
cation of the game, it is due to the fact that the description of the underlying states is
insuﬃcient. The rational players then would not and should not be satisﬁed with such a
description. If the description is reﬁned, to its limit, then all the payoﬀ relevant issues
and the structure of knowledge among players can be summarized in a state space. We
accept this view in our model, and assumes that there is an underlying state space and
each state is a complete description of the game.
The second point is that there is a single, common prior over these states and each
player evaluates his private information by the Bayes rule. We have a diﬀerent view on
this. When the players do not know payoﬀs and thus the information is incomplete, the
players must take into account “risks” about payoﬀs: since his private information is
insuﬃcient, the player can learn payoﬀs only probabilistically at best. But there is also
2ambiguity about the strategic environment: the player may have some thoughts about
possibilities, but they are so vague that the player is unable to assign probabilities.
In principle, a model of incomplete information games should be able to address risks
and uncertainty separately, to study if and how these two aspects of incomplete information
aﬀect the outcome of the game. But in Harsanyi’s framework with a single and common
prior, by construction, there is no technical diﬀerence between genuine lack of information
and ambiguity about payoﬀs and/or knowledge among players.
So even accepting the postulate that the players should be able to describe all the
relevant states, we think that it is still natural that the players have little idea about the
likelihood of these states. Thus for instance we want to allow for events whose probability
is perfectly agreed, but the players cannot evaluate subevents of the events; that is, there
are many ways to assign probabilities to the subevents, and the players are not sure about
which is the right one. Instead of a single prior, we allow for multiple priors.
The assumption of multiple priors can be justiﬁed at the level of individual decision
making to begin with (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). It has been criticized that the
standard framework of Bayesian theory does not necessarily capture the aspect of decision
making which can be attributed to ambiguity of the problem; e.g., the Ellsberg paradox.
Ambiguity is not resolved by considering more sophisticated Bayesian models, and the
attitude towards ambiguity should be modelled diﬀerently from that towards risks.
In strategic environments of incomplete information, the problem is more serious,
and we think that the use of multiple priors is justiﬁed all the more. Say we accept
the Bayesian view and assume that from the point of view of a single player, a player
can assign probabilities to possible events using his own private information; that is,
the Ellsberg paradox type problem does not occur as far as a player evaluates his own
payoﬀs. But there still remains a room for ambiguity about what the other players might
be contemplating, and this matters. You may be so conﬁdent that you could assign
probabilities on payoﬀ relevant states, but you may hesitate to assume the same ability
for the other players. Then your strategic decision making will be aﬀe c t e db yt h ew a yt h e
game appears ambiguous to the other players.
In other words, even if the uncertainty concerning payoﬀ relevant issues may be reduced
to risks, the same procedure may be unduly demanding for the uncertainty on knowledge
about how the other players might think about each other. In such an environment, there
will be strategic eﬀects from the ambiguity about players’ knowledge, which cannot be
addressed by a single common prior model.
To get more concrete idea about how our approach can be applied, consider the fol-
lowing simple example. Say there are two experienced investors who are interested in the
rating of the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm to be announced near future. There are four possible
ratings, 1, 2, 3, and 4, where the smaller number is better. From the past experiences,
they know each other very well and they share the idea that the proﬁtability of this ﬁrm
is neutral in the sense that the probability of good ratings 1 or 2 is 0.5, and that of bad
r a t i n g s3o r4i s0 .5. Investor 1 is very good at identifying very promising ﬁrm and Investor
2 is very good at identifying very bad one. That is, by the private information, Investor
31c a nt e l l{1} from {2,3,4}, and Investor 2 can tell {4} from {1,2,3}. Now suppose that
the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is in fact very good. Then Investor 1 knows for sure that the rating
will be 1, but he is unsure about what Investor 2 might think. Investor 1 can deduce that
Investor 2 concludes that the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is not very bad, but it is ambiguous how
Investor 2 might think about the relative likelihood in {1,2,3}.
A natural set of priors is the set of all probabilities on {1,2,3,4} such that probabilities
of events {1,2} and {3,4} are 0.5, and thereby we can express the fact that the two
investors agree upon the likelihood of these two events. When the true state is 1, Investor
2 updates his beliefs. Since he was unable to determine the probabilities over 3 and 4
to start with, he will not be able to tell whether 4 did not occur by chance, or 4 had
no chance to start with. So learning that 4 has not occurred does not reduce ambiguity
about the relative probabilities of {1,2} and {3}, not to mention those between 1 and 2.
Then Investor 1 must take into account not only the fact that Investor 2 does not know if
1 has occurred or not, but also the fact that Investor 2 is not able to assign a unique set
of probabilities to {1,2,3}.
Notice that the above reasoning depends on the updating rule. In principle player’s
optimal behavior depends on how he updates priors. We assume that the updating rule is
also part of the description of the game, i.e., the updating rules are exogenously given and
the players understand the updating rules of all the players. We do so by the following
reasons. First, in the multiple priors models, there are various reasonable updating rules,
and they have diﬀerent strategic implications. So the model should not subscribe itself
to a particular updating rule. Secondly, since updating rules have strategic implications,
endogenizing them will yield excessive degrees of freedom, and consequently the model
will lose its descriptive power. Thirdly, studying the roles of diﬀerent updating rules in
games is of interest for itself.
Obviously, there can be many reasonable criteria for decision making under uncertainty.
We adopt the Gilboa-Schmeidler approach to capture ambiguity and aversion to it. Al-
though we are aware of valid criticism of Epstein and Zhang (2001) that this is not exactly
what should be termed ambiguity or uncertainty, we contend that the Gilboa-Schmeidler
approach at least addresses some important aspects of ambiguity and uncertainty, and its
tractable form is also very appealing.
Our equilibrium concept is interim: that is, each player chooses the best action for any
realization of private signal in equilibrium. It is well known that a player with multiple
priors tends to exhibit dynamic inconsistent behavior for any updating rule; that is, a
strategy which is utility maximizing ex ante may specify actions which will be deemed
inferior once private information is received, and vice versa. We contend that the interim
notion is more relevant, since even in Harsanyi’s framework, the ex ante maximization
of utility is a purely theoretical tool and it happens to coincide with the interim notion
because the expected utility with Bayesian updating is dynamically consistent.
Moreover, it is interesting to investigate the implication of some players’ dynamic
inconsistent behavior to other players who may have a single prior. Even if you are a
textbook Bayesian player, you have to take into account how other non-Bayesian players
4with an unusual updating rule may behave. We emphasize again that the study of such
a non-Bayesian behavior is all the more important in strategic environments. Even if one
regards the non-Bayesian behavior as irrelevant at the level of individual decision making,
he will choose diﬀerent actions from the ones he would against Bayesians, since actions
taken by those non-Bayesians will inﬂuence his welfare, and vice versa.
Let us mention related works. Lo (1998) uses a multiple prior model to study auctions
as a game with incomplete information.1 As far as we know, there has been no attempt
to study the incomplete information games as a general class of games with multiple
priors, with an important exception of Epstein and Wang (1996).2 They present a very
general form of games of incomplete information and our model constitutes a subclass of
their games. Our focus is rather on presentation of workable and user friendly special
models, which is rich enough to address issues of incompleteness of information beyond
the standard Bayesian approach.
Let us conclude this introduction with an outline of this paper. We shall give the
details of our model in Section 2. We then propose two equilibrium concepts, which
are natural extension of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Section 3. We contend that
both concepts make sense, and establish the existence results for them. Section 4 contains
examples to demonstrate how our model works and to show some interesting features of the
model. In Section 5 we discuss the foundations of the model to argue why our model with
these equilibrium concepts constitutes a desirable representation of incomplete information
games. We also provide a result generalizing the agreement theorem of Aumann (1976)
under the common multiple prior assumption, which is an interesting by-product. We also
discuss complete information games and related works in the literature.
2 Incomplete information games with multiple priors
2.1 Basic setup
We consider ﬁnite player incomplete information games with ﬁnitely many actions and
states. Except for multiple priors, the setup is standard. The players are indexed by
i ∈ I := {1,...,I}. Each player i ∈ I has a ﬁnite set of actions denoted by Ai.T h es e t
of action proﬁl e si sd e n o t e db yA =
Q
i∈I Ai with generic element a =( ai)i∈I.W es h a l l
also write a =( ai,a −i) ∈ Ai ×
Q
j6=i Aj abusing notation.
The set of payoﬀ relevant states is denoted by Ω,a n dΩ is assumed to be ﬁnite.3
The incompleteness of information is summarized by a random signal τ =( τi)i∈I, each
component of which is observed privately by each player. When ω ∈ Ω occurs, player
i ∈ I observes a signal τi (ω), and then chooses an action in Ai. Denote by Ti the range
of τi and let T =
Q
i∈I Ti.T h u sτi is a function from Ω to Ti and τ =( τi)i∈I is a function
1Ozdenoren (2002) further elaborates the work of Lo (1998). See also Chen et al. (2002).
2See also Ahn (2003).
3The model can be extended to the model where Ω is an inﬁnite measurable state space, but we restrict
our attention to the ﬁnite case in order to avoid various measurability and continuity issues associated
with an inﬁnite state space.
5from Ω to T.
For any ﬁnite set X denote by ∆(X) the set of all probability distributions on X.A
strategy of player i ∈ I is a function σi from Ti to ∆(Ai). Write σi (ai|ti) for the probability
of player i choosing action ai ∈ Ai when he observes ti ∈ Ti by convention. Denote by
Si the set of all strategies for player i and let S =
Q
i∈I Si be the set of strategy proﬁles.
F o ra na c t i o np r o ﬁle a =( ai)i∈I and a proﬁle of realization of signals t =( ti)i∈I ∈ T,w e
write σ (a|t) for the probability of action proﬁle a chosen, i.e., σ(a|t)=
Q
i∈I σi (ai|ti). We
shall also write σ =( σi,σ−i) ∈ Si ×
Q
j6=i Sj and σ−i (a−i|t−i)=
Q
j6=i σj (aj|tj), abusing
notation.
Player i’s preference ordering over strategy proﬁles will be generated by a payoﬀ func-
tion ui : A × Ω → R. In the standard incomplete information game, one could assume in
addition that the payoﬀ function ui(a,ω) depends on players’ observed realizations of the
signals only, by replacing ui(a,ω)w i t hˆ ui(a,t)=E[u(a,ω)|τ(w)=t]. In our framework,
however, this transformation may change the strategic structure of the game because we
will consider multiple priors and the expectation operator is not uniquely determined.
2.2 Multiple priors
We depart from the standard framework of incomplete information games by assuming
that there is a non-empty compact set of priors Pi ⊆ ∆(Ω)f o rp l a y e ri ∈ I.W ea s s u m e
that there is no null signal, i.e., P(τ−1
i (ti)) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti, P ∈ Pi,a n di ∈ I.T h e
standard incomplete information game corresponds to the case where Pi is a singleton for
all i ∈ I.T h es e tPi is intended to capture the ambiguity about the structure of the game,
which is diﬀerent from the strategic risk generated by the other players’ choices of actions.
We will demonstrate the diﬀerent roles of “ambiguity” and “risk” by some examples later.
A natural and interesting case is when the set of priors is generated by an underlying
information sub-ﬁeld E ⊆ 2Ω and a probability measure Q deﬁned over E. Note that Q
assigns a probability to every E ∈ E, but not to E 6∈ E.T h u s ,i fE 6=2 Ω, then a probability
of some event is not known. The inner measure P∗ :2 Ω → [0,1] and the outer measure
P∗ :2 Ω → [0,1] are deﬁned by the rules:
P∗(E)= s u p
X⊆E,X∈E
Q(X),P ∗(E)= i n f
E⊆X,X∈E
Q(X)
for all E ⊆ Ω.I fE =2 Ω, P∗ = Q = P∗ by construction. Consider a set of priors
Pi = {P ∈ ∆(Ω):P∗(E) ≤ P(E) ≤ P∗(E) for all E ⊆ Ω}. (1)
To interpret, think of E as an information structure which is known to player i,a n dQ is a
probability assessment of E. For an “unknown” event E/ ∈ E, P∗(E) is the most cautious
estimate of the probability of E and P∗(E) is the most optimistic estimate of probability
of E.T h u si nt h i sc a s e ,t h es e tPi can be thought as the set of priors which are consistent
with Q and E in the sense that each P ∈ Pi assigns to each unknown event a probability
weight at least as much as the cautious estimate and at most as much as the optimistic
estimate. If Q and E are objectively given to all the players, it is also natural to assume
players have a common prior set deﬁned by (1).
62.3 Updating rules
Each player chooses an action after the private signal is revealed, as we mentioned earlier.
Like in the standard Bayesian games, updating upon private information generates the
diﬀerences in views of players. Since the prior is not unique, however, the private informa-
tion will matter through two channels in our framework. The ﬁrst is the channel through
the standard Bayesian updating: when player i ∈ I observes ti,h eu p d a t e seach prior
P ∈ Pi by the Bayes rule, and the updated prior in turn aﬀects his choice of actions, just
as in the standard analysis. But the following second channel is not captured in the stan-
dard analysis: since information is private, the sets of updated priors are diﬀerent among
the players in general even if Pi is the same for all i ∈ I. Thus after updating, the state
of ambiguity represented by the set of updated prior probabilities is private. In heuristic
words, a revelation of private information might change the degree of ambiguity about the
structure of the game, and this may occur diﬀerently among the players. Thus diﬀerences
in views about the ambiguity of payoﬀs are generated by how the players process their
private information to re-evaluate the ambiguity. We shall formalize these ideas below.
For each P ∈ ∆(Ω)a n dti ∈ Ti, denote by P(·|ti) ∈ ∆(Ω) the conditional probabilities
over Ω;t h a ti s ,P(E|ti)=P
¡
τ−1







for E ⊆ Ω.L e t
Pi(ti)={P(·|ti) ∈ ∆(Ω):P ∈ Pi}
be the set of posteriors when ti ∈ Ti has been observed. An updating rule Φi : Ti → 2Pi(ti)
for player i ∈ I is a function that assigns a non-empty compact subset of Pi(ti) to each
ti ∈ Ti.A f t e r ti is observed, player i uses posteriors in Φi (ti) to evaluate his actions.
The updating rules for players are given as one of the primitives of the game, and the
equilibrium concepts for themselves will be well deﬁned for any such given rules. When
Pi is a singleton for all i ∈ I, the updating rule coincides with that given by the Bayes
rule, and our model will be reduced to the standard Bayesian games. But when Pi is not
a singleton, there is a vast variety of sensible updating rules in principle. Among them,
there are a couple of natural and technically tractable updating rules of particular interest,
and we shall concentrate on these cases in the examples we consider.4
The ﬁrst is the Fagin-Halpern updating rule or the full Bayesian (FB) updating rule
(Fagin and Halpern, 1990; Jaﬀray, 1992):
Φi (ti)=Pi(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti. (2)
In words, this is the case where the private information leads the player to update the risk
component of the priors but does not help him to update the degree of uncertainty.
The second is the Dempster-Shafer updating rule or the maximum likelihood (ML)
updating rule (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976):







} for all ti ∈ Ti. (3)
Thus, Φi (ti) is the set of posteriors derived from priors that evaluates ti as the most likely
signal.
4See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) for axiomatization of updating rules.
72.4 Deﬁnition of games and decision rules
To sum up the setup, an incomplete information game with multiple priors is a tuple
G := hΩ,I,(τi)i∈I,(Pi)i∈I,(Φi)i∈I,(Ai)i∈I,(ui)i∈Ii. The incompleteness of information is
expressed by the priors (Pi)i∈I, the signals (τi)i∈I, and the updating rules (Φi)i∈I.
The equilibrium concepts we introduce in the next section adopt the following decision
rules in G.A f t e rti is observed, player i uses posteriors in Φi (ti) to evaluate his actions.
The interim payoﬀ to a randomized action µi ∈ ∆(Ai)g i v e nσ−i ∈ S−i(=
Q
j6=i Sj)a n d








µi(ai)ui (ai,a −i,ω)σ−i (a−i|τ−i (ω))Q(ω).
We write Ui(ai,σ−i|Q)i n s t e a do fUi(µi,σ−i|Q)i fµi(ai) = 1. Since the set of actions and
the set of states are ﬁnite, Ui(µi,σ−i|Q) is continuous in (µi,σ−i,Q). We assume that each
player uses an extremely pessimistic decision rule. That is, given the updated priors, we
require that each player evaluates his actions using the worst possible scenario. Formally,
after ti ∈ Ti is observed, the interim payoﬀ to a randomized action µi ∈ ∆(Ai)g i v e n
σ−i ∈ S−i is
Vi (µi,σ−i|ti)= m i n
Q∈Φi(ti)
Ui(µi,σ−i|Q). (4)
Notice that the interim payoﬀ function is well behaved, continuous and concave in
µi because Ui is continuous and the set Φi (ti) is compact by assumption. The concavity
follows since it is the minimum of linear functions of µi.B u tVi (µi,σ−i|ti) is not necessarily
linear in µi. S oap l a y e rm a ys t r i c t l yp r e f e rt or a ndomize actions, which will lead us to
consider two diﬀerent equilibrium concepts. Such an extreme decision rule is well studied
in the decision theory literature (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) and hence it constitutes
one of natural speciﬁcations of games with uncertainty and ambiguity, but certainly not
the only one.5
3 Equilibrium concepts and existence
3.1 Equilibrium with multiple priers I: mixed strategy
We start with an equilibrium concept for G = hΩ,I,(τi)i∈I,(Pi)i∈I,(Φi)i∈I,(Ai)i∈I,(ui)i∈Ii
adopting the standard interpretation of mixed strategy in incomplete information games.














for all µi ∈ ∆(Ai).
5It is known that, for some class of sets of priors, the decision rule of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
coincides with the decision rule based upon the Choquet integral (Schmeidler, 1986, 1989) with respect to
convex capacities. In that case, our model of an incomplete information game with multiple priors can be
deﬁned as an incomplete information game with convex capacities.
8That is, in a mixed equilibrium of G, each player is maximizing his interim payoﬀs
by choosing a lottery conditional on his signal. It is clear that if the set of priors Pi is a
singleton for all i ∈ I, the mixed equilibrium of G is equivalent to the standard Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.












action ai ∈ Ai, i.e., no pure action yields a higher payoﬀ to player i. Since the interim
payoﬀ function Vi (µi,σ−i|ti) given by (4) is concave in µi, pure actions will often be
strictly dominated by optimally mixed actions.6
Proposition 2 A mixed equilibrium of G exists.
Proof. We apply the standard existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium. Since Ω and Ai
are ﬁnite, Si is compact and convex for all i ∈ I.F o rσ−i ∈ S−i,l e tBi (σ−i) ⊆ Si be the










W ea r ed o n ei fσ−i 7→ Bi (σ−i) is a non-empty, compact and convex valued, and up-
per hemicontinuous correspondence by applying Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem to σ 7→
Q
i∈I Bi (σ−i).
Note that Ui(µi,σ−i|Q) is continuous in (µi,σ−i,Q)a n dt h a tΦi (ti)i sc o m p a c t .S i n c e
Vi(µi,σ−i|ti) is the minimum of Ui(µi,σ−i|Q)o v e rQ ∈ Φi(ti), Vi (µi,σ−i|ti) is continuous
in (µi,σ−i) and concave in µi. Thus, for each ti, the correspondence which maps σ−i
to the set {σi ∈ Si : σi (ti) ∈ argmaxµi Vi (µi,σ−i|ti)} is non-empty, compact and convex
valued, and upper hemicontinuous. Thus, Bi(σ−i) is compact and convex valued, and
upper hemicontinuous as the intersection of such correspondences. Finally, Bi (σ−i)i s
non-empty, since for each ti, {σi ∈ Si : σi (ti) ∈ argmaxµi Vi(µi,σ−i|ti)} is non-empty and
this set puts no restriction on the component corresponding to t0
i 6= ti. This completes the
proof. ¥
Since a mixed equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game, it inherits
the standard properties of the Nash equilibrium. For instance, in a mixed equilibrium, no
player ever uses a dominated action.
3.2 Equilibrium with multiple priors II: pure strategy
Allowing mixed strategy as in the previous subsection is a technically natural extension of
the standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, since preferences exhibit non-linearity
in probability, the concept of mixed strategy is less innocuous than in the standard case.
For instance, since the preference over mixed strategies is concave, the players may wish
to randomize two actions if they are equally favorable. Then it is not clear what pre-
vents the player from keep randomizing, beyond the strategy space speciﬁed before. Such
possibilities are simply assumed away in the previous setup.
6Such an example will be discussed in Subsection 4.3.
9Thus we introduce an alternative notion, which is a natural analogue to the equilibrium
in beliefs by Crawford (1990), so we shall adopt the same terminology.
Deﬁnition 3 As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle σ∗ ∈ S is an equilibrium in beliefs of G if, for each i ∈ I















The equilibrium in beliefs of G can be understood just as an equilibrium in beliefs
for the complete information games in strategic form. In particular, in an equilibrium
in beliefs σ∗,e a c hp l a y e ri is taking a pure action, but is believed to be randomizing
over pure actions that are indiﬀerent, as prescribed in σ∗
i , by the other players. Such
beliefs are consistent with player i’s interim payoﬀ maximization behavior, although it is
not necessarily fully self-fulﬁlling in the sense that players’ beliefs coincide with players’
actual (methods of) choices of actions.
It is clear that if the set of priors Pi is a singleton for all i ∈ I, an equilibrium in
beliefs of G is equivalent to the standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It follows directly
from the deﬁnitions that if a mixed equilibrium σ∗ has the property that every player i
at any ti chooses a pure action, then it is an equilibrium in beliefs. When the updating
rule is singleton-valued, then both equilibrium concepts coincide, since after updating
the players’ preferences are linear in probability assigned to actions. But in general, an
equilibrium in beliefs of G is not necessarily a mixed equilibrium of G, nor vise versa.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium in beliefs of G exists.
Proof. We modify Crawford’s existence argument to ﬁt our setting. For each i ∈ I,a n d














By construction, Bi (σ−i) is non-empty. It is convex valued and upper hemicontinuous as
the intersection of convex valued and upper hemicontinuous correspondences (note that
Vi (a0
i,σ−i|ti) is continuous in σ−i). So the correspondence σ 7→
Q
i∈I Bi (σ−i) has a ﬁxed
point σ∗. Then by the construction of Bi, σ∗ constitutes an equilibrium in beliefs of G. ¥
Since each player chooses a best action given information and the others’ strategies, no
player ever chooses an action which is dominated by another (pure) action. An equilibrium
action may be dominated by a “mixed action” but like Crawford’s idea in the complete
information games, the basic hypothesis here is that the players never randomize, and it
is their beliefs which are in equilibrium.
104 Examples: ambiguity under strategic interaction
We shall present examples which clarify the role of ambiguity in our model.
4.1 Diﬀerence of ambiguity induced by private information
In our setup, incomplete information can be expressed by diﬀerences in private infor-
mation, as Harsanyi’s Bayesian game. We shall give an example in which diﬀerences of
ambiguity can be expressed by diﬀerences in private information.
Let there be two players, and consider a state space,
Ω = {1,2,3a,3b,4a,4b}
where the players have assigned probability ε/2 to the events {1} and {2} and probability
(1 − ε)/2t ot h ee v e n t s{3a,3b} and {4a,4b}, respectively, where 0 < ε ≤ 1 is a given
parameter. The diﬀerence between state 3a and state 3b and that between 4a and 4b are
ambiguous in the sense that the players do not know how the probabilities assigned to
{3a,3b} and {4a,4b} should be allocated to these states. Thus the players have a common
set of priors, which is:










Let E = {1,2}. The following table summarizes the actions and payoﬀs, where Player
1 chooses a row and Player 2 chooses a column, and the numbers on the left are Player









Note that Player 1’s best response is to choose the action Player 2 chooses. Given ω,
Player 2’s payoﬀs are independent of Player 1’s choice of action, and Player 2 wants to
choose β if ω ∈ E and to choose α if ω 6∈ E. Notice that Player 2’s payoﬀs do not depend
on Player 1’s choice of actions.
As a bench mark, consider the case where there is no private information. Then both
players agree that event E occurs with probability ε, and this is common knowledge. So in
this game the multiplicity of priors is inessential if both players remain uninformed about
the state. If ε is small enough, then playing α maximizes Player 2’s payoﬀ regardless of
Player 1’s behavior, and thus a unique equilibrium is that both players choose α.
Now let us consider private information. The ranges of signals (τ1,τ2)a r e
T1 = {{1,3a,3b},{2,4a,4b}},
T2 = {{1,3a,4a},{2,3b,4b}},
11where τi (ω) ∈ Ti is the set containing ω ∈ Ω. The reader may ﬁnd it easy to think of this
as if the private information is given by partitions suggested by T1 and T2.
We assume that both players use the FB updating rule (2). So the set of updated
priors is that of all probability distributions which are consistent with observation. We
have:
Φ1({1,3a,3b})= {P ∈ ∆(Ω):P({1})=ε,P({3a,3b})=1− ε},





ε +2( x + y)
,P ({3a})=
2x






















ε +2( x + y)
,P ({3b})=
2x


















We shall ﬁnd a unique equilibrium of this game. Note that the updated probabilities of
E are:
{P(E)|P ∈ Φ1(t1)} = {ε}, {P(E)|P ∈ Φ2(t2)} =[ ε/(2 − ε),1]
for all t1 ∈ T1 and t2 ∈ T2.7 Thus, within each player, the evaluation of E is the same
for every state ω ∈ Ω. But in spite that the players start with a common set of multiple
priors, they have diﬀerent uncertainty concerning E when ε > 0; Player 1 assigns the
unique probability ε and Player 2 assigns multiple probabilities ranging from ε/(2 − ε)
to 1. The diﬀerence of uncertainty is attributed to the diﬀerence of private information
T1 and T2.
To ﬁnd optimal actions, let p be the probability Player 2 chooses action α. For any
t2 ∈ T2,t h ei n t e r i mp a y o ﬀ of Player 2 is
min
P∈Φ2(t2)
((−2p +0· (1 − p)) · P(E)+( 1 p +0· (1 − p)) · (1 − P(E)))
=m i n
P(E)∈[ε/(2−ε),1]
(−3pP(E)+p)=−3p + p = −2p
if p>0, and it is 0 if p = 0, which implies that β is a strictly dominant action for
all t2 ∈ T2. Knowing this, Player 1, who wants to match his action, must choose β for
all t1 ∈ T1. To summarize, the game has a unique equilibrium, in both deﬁnitions we
proposed, in which both players always choose β. Note that this is true for any small
ε > 0.
Now look at the case ε = 0 where there is no diﬀerence of uncertainty concerning the
event E because E is null:
{P(E)|P ∈ Φ1(t1)} = {P(E)|P ∈ Φ2(t2)} = {0}.
7Though players have diﬀerent uncertainty, there is a common probability in the sense that {P(E)|P ∈
Φ1(t1)} ∩ {P(E)|P ∈ Φ2(t2)} 6= ∅. We will discuss this issue in the next section.
12Thus payoﬀs are given by the table corresponding to ω 6∈ E with probability one. So we
have a complete information game with a randomization device τ, but since α is a strictly
dominant action for Player 2, we conclude that there is a unique equilibrium where both
players choose α.
In conclusion, the equilibrium set changes discontinuously with respect to ε at ε =0 .
Note that even at ε = 0, the players have multiple priors. But Player 2’s set of updated
probabilities of the relevant event E gets degenerate at ε = 0, and this fact generates the
discontinuity. Intuitively, Player 2, being very pessimistic, hesitates to choose action α
which is very bad when E occurs, as long as there is some chance that E is true. When
ε = 0, his worry disappears and he is willing to choose α.
Notice the dynamic inconsistency of Player 2’s behavior: suppose Player 2 could com-
m i ti na d v a n c et ot h ea c t i o nh ew i l lb ep l a y i n ga f t e ra r r i v a lo fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n .T h e n
for any prior in P2, the value of committing to always playing α is −2 × ε +1× (1 − ε),
which is positive if ε is small, better than the value of committing to β whose value is zero.
Since Player 1 is just reacting to Player 2’s action, the diﬀerence of the equilibrium be-
havior from the bench mark case can also be attributed (at least partially) to the dynamic
inconsistent behavior of Player 2.
But for a game theoretic implication, a more important point is the way Player 1’s
behavior is aﬀected. Notice that Player 1 unambiguously assigns a single probability to
the payoﬀ relevant event E, irrespective of the value of ε and his private information. So
as far as his payoﬀs are concerned, he has no uncertainty at all. But he knows that his
opponent tends to interpret her private information very pessimistically, and he must take
this into account in equilibrium. In fact, this example can be modiﬁed that Player 1 has a
single prior; just take any prior in P1. Hence this example can also be seen as an instance
of a standard Bayesian player’s action is aﬀected by the other non-Bayesian player.
4.2 An equilibrium with no BNE justiﬁcation and the role of updating
rule
Here we shall give a simple example where there is an equilibrium with multiple priors
under the FB updating rule (2) which cannot be justiﬁed as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for the given state space and information structure, and moreover it is not an equilibrium
if the ML updating rule (3) is adopted. So this is also an example to understand the role
of updating as well as multiplicity of priors.
We use the same notation as in the previous example. Let Ω = {1,2a,2b,3} with
P1 = P2 = {P ∈ ∆(Ω):P (1) = 0.25,P ({2a,2b})=0 .5,P(3) = 0.25}.













13The signals are given by:
T1 = {{1},{2a},{2b},{3}},T 2 = {{1,2a},{2b,3}}.
So Player 1 always knows the payoﬀs, and Player 2’s payoﬀs do not depend on ω.S ot h e r e
is no “ambiguity” in the payoﬀ structure.
With the FB updating rule, the following strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium
with multiple priors for both deﬁnitions.
σ1({1})=β, σ1({2a})=α, σ1({2b})=α, σ1({3})=β,
σ2({1,2a})=β, σ2({2b,3})=β.
Let us conﬁrm this. Since α is a dominant action for Player 1 when ω ∈ {2a,2b},p l a y i n g
α in 2a and 2b is optimal. If Player 2 plays β, β is a best response for Player 1 when
ω ∈ {1,3}. So Player 1’s behavior is optimal. Player 2’s behavior can be shown to be
optimal by a similar calculation as in the previous example. Intuitively, when Player 1 is
to play β in state 1, after observing {1,2a}, if Player 2 is to play α with some probability,
he will assign probability one to state 1 which is the worst scenario, and then playing β
for sure is a best response. A symmetric argument applies for {2b,3}.
But the strategy proﬁle given above cannot be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for any
single prior P ∈ Pi. The reason is as follows: since P (2a)+P (2b)=0 .5 must hold,
one of 2a and 2b must have ex ante probability no less than 0.25. Assume that it is 2a
without loss of generality since the structure of the game is symmetric. Then after {1,2a}
is observed, Player 2 must assign at least probability 0.5t os t a t e2 a.S i n c eP l a y e r1p l a y s
α in state 2a, this implies that Player 2 knows that α is played at least probability 0.5,
and then he must choose α since it is the risk dominant action for Player 2.
The strategy proﬁle above is not an equilibrium with the ML updating rule. For
Player 2, after observing {1,2a}, the prior which makes this most likely is the one assigning
ex ante probability of 0.5 to 2a. Thus he believes action β and α occurs with ratio 0.25 : 0.5,
and so Player 2 must play α. Since it is never a best response of Player 1 to play β with
any probability in states 2a and 2b, we see that Player 2 must always play α in any
equilibrium. Then Player 1 must always play α since it is a best response to α for any ω.
In conclusion, with the ML updating rule, in a unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle, both
players always play α.
4.3 Diﬀerence of two equilibrium concepts
Let us give an example to clarify the diﬀerences of the two notions of equilibria we pro-
posed.8 Let I = {1,2} and Ω = {1,2}. The set of priors P1 = P2 is just the set of all
probability distributions on Ω. Player 2 observes every ω ∈ Ω, but Player 1 has no private
information. Player 1 has three actions, α,β,γ and Player 2 has two actions 1 and 2.
Independent of Player 1’s action, Player 2’s payoﬀ is 10 if he chooses action ω when
ω ∈ Ω occurs, otherwise 0. Then for both equilibrium concepts, Player 2 must play action
8This example and discussion are inspired by Lo (1996).
14ω when ω ∈ Ω is observed. This makes the game eﬀectively a single person decision
problem of Player 1 against the nature, where the decision maker has multiple priors P1.





Then the payoﬀst oa c t i o n sα and β are both zero owing to Player 1’s pessimistic
expectations, whereas action γ is worth 1. So a unique equilibrium in beliefs is that
Player 1 chooses γ and Player 2 behaves as described above. But if mixed actions are
considered, randomizing equally between α and β yields 5 irrespective of priors, and this is
payoﬀ maximizing. So in a unique mixed equilibrium, Player 1 chooses this randomization
strategy.
5 Discussions and generalizations
5.1 Foundations
Let us comment on a couple of issues on the foundation of our model: preferences and
types.
For preferences, we simply postulated that there exist sets of priors and that the play-
ers’ preferences over strategies are induced by the most pessimistic posteriors. A possible
objection is lack of axiomatic foundations, and our defense is as follows. As for the use of
multiple priors, in a single person setting, there is a well known axiomatization of such pref-
erence relations by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Even for complete information games,
ac o m m o nj u s t i ﬁcation for expected utility preferences is based on individual decision
making. So if this line of justiﬁcation is accepted, we contend that the Gilboa-Schmeidler
axiomatization justiﬁes our multiple priors approach as well.
To discuss the role of types in our model, let us ﬁrst review the standard approach:
each point of a type space are associated a state of nature as well as a single posterior for
each player on the type space itself. The type of a player encodes not only his beliefs on
the space, but also his beliefs about others’ beliefs, his beliefs about others’ beliefs about
others’ beliefs, and so on. Whether or not thise n t i r es e q u e n c eo fb e l i e f sc a nb ec a p t u r e d
i nas i n g l et y p es p a c ew i t hacommon prior is a fundamental question to the construction
and analysis of games with incomplete information. Mertens and Zamir (1985) did the
ﬁrst mathematical analysis on this, and gave an aﬃrmative answer.
In our framework, we postulate that a multiple posterior version of type spaces as
above: with each point of a type space are associated a state of nature as well as multiple
posteriors for each player on the type space itself. Then a similar question as above will
naturally arise. Can one construct a type space with multiple priors as above from a
h i e r a r c h yo fs e t so fb e l i e f sw h i c hj u s t i ﬁes a common set of priors, or something alike?
15We chose a neutral position on this: we allowed heterogenous sets of priors, but for
the examples to illustrate the power of the model, we assumed a common set of priors.
But obviously it is of great theoretical interest how far the analysis of Mertens and Zamir
can be extended.
A seminal work in this direction is Epstein and Wang (1996), which criticize the
Bayesian approach of comprehensive belief types and provide a preference based construc-
tion of general type space which serves as a foundation for games with incomplete infor-
mation. Our model conforms to their general deﬁnition of incomplete information games.
But the preference based approach, by construction, does not spell out the structure of
sets of beliefs independently.
More closely related to our model is Ahn (2003)’s construction of type spaces. He con-
sidered players with multiple priors over the state space, which is similar to our model, and
studied generalization of the classic coherency condition which produces a Mertens-Zamir
s t y l et y p es p a c et oe n c o d et h eh i e r a r c h yo fb e l i efs. He discussed a class of incomplete infor-
mation games with multiple priors to demonstrate that his result serves as its foundation.
The class of games in Ahn (2003) consist of players with multiple priors and general pref-
erences over players’ beliefs and consequences. It can be seen that if the preferences is
deﬁned in terms of the decision rule of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the class of games
are reduced to our model. In this sense, Ahn (2003)’s result directly serves as a foundation
of our model.9
5.2 Common knowledge and “agreeing to disagree”
Despite mathematical justiﬁcations, it has been pointed out that the common prior as-
sumption has too much economic implications; e.g., various no trade results originated in
Milgrom and Stokey (1982). This excess power of the model gives rise to some skepti-
cism, and indeed it has motivated many works on relaxing the common prior assumption
(more importantly common support assumption) in the literature. So a generalized type
space argument justifying a common set of priors is not necessarily enough to rule out
heterogeneity of priors sets.
B u ti ti sn o tc l e a ri ft h ec o m m o ns e to fp r i ors assumption in our model have similar
drawbacks. Recall that the diﬀerences in views are also expressed by private information
in our model. But since there are two channels, risks and ambiguity, through which private
information makes diﬀerences, our model is rich enough to distinguish the strategic eﬀects
of ambiguity from the usual Bayesian eﬀects. Indeed, recall that all the examples in
Section 4 assume a common set of priors. Thus the important implications we draw from
the examples do not rely on the heterogeneity of priors at all. For instance, we saw in
Subsection 4.2 a game where there is an intuitive equilibrium with common multiple priors
representing the ambiguity about the game, but this equilibrium cannot be explained by
9Ahn (2003) also deﬁned an equilibrium concept, which can be translated in our framework. Roughly
speaking, a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium in Ahn’s sense in our model if it is both a mixed equilibrium
and a equilibrium in beliefs in our model. Since there are games where these two concepts do not imply
each other as we saw in Subsection 4.3, Ahn’s equilibrium may not exist in general.
16a single common prior.
Therefore, the common set of priors assumption does not seem to be too restrictive as
far as our main messages are concerned. But obviously there should be some restrictions.
We investigate this issue below, by considering the role of “common knowledge” via the
problem of “agreeing to disagree” ` a la Aumann (1976) in our setup.
Since our premise is that the structure of the game is completely determined by state
ω ∈ Ω, and the private information of player i is given by τi, it is natural to adopt
Aumann’s formulation of common knowledge in our setup. That is, an event E ⊆ Ω is




i (ti):ti ∈ Ti
ª
, i =1 ,...,I. Thus the multiplicity of priors
does not play any role in determining whether or not an event is common knowledge
among the players.
Let an event E ⊆ Ω be given. For each player i ∈ I and a state ω ∈ Ω,d e ﬁne ρi(E|ω)
by the rule:
ρi(E|ω)={p ∈ [0,1] : p = P(E),P ∈ Φi(τi(ω))},
which is the collection of player i’s ex post evaluation of E at ω ∈ Ω.
A natural question in view of Aumann’s theorem is if players with common multiple
priors can agree to disagree, and if they do, to what extent they agree. We attempt to
answer this question by the following proposition, which contains Aumann’s agreement
theorem as a special case.
Proposition 5 Let E ⊆ Ω be an event. Suppose that
•P i = P ⊆ ∆(Ω) for all i ∈ I,
• every player adopts the FB updating rule,
• for all i ∈ I, ρi(E|ω) is common knowledge at ω ∈ Ω : that is, the event {ω0 ∈ Ω :
ρi(E|ω)=ρi(E|ω0)} is common knowledge,





Proof. The common knowledge assumption implies that there exists a common knowledge
event F with ω ∈ F such that ρi(E|ω0)=ρi(E|ω) for all ω0 ∈ F for each i ∈ I. For any ω0 ∈
F,s e tti = τi(ω0), and then it must be true that τ−1






















F|ti). That is, the conditional probabilities of E and E ∩ F are the same at any ω0 ∈ F
for any P ∈ P.
17Let p∗(i), p∗(i) ∈ [0,1] be the upper bound and the lower bound of ρi(E|ω0):
p∗(i)= m i n
p∈ρi(E|ω0)





p∗(i)= m a x
p∈ρi(E|ω0)





for all ω0 ∈ F.
Let P∗,P∗ ∈ P be such that:
P∗(E|F)=P∗(E ∩ F)/P∗(F)=m i n
P∈P
P(E ∩ F)/P(F),
P∗(E|F)=P∗(E ∩ F)/P∗(F)=m a x
P∈P
P(E ∩ F)/P(F).
Then, for any ti ∈ τi (F), we have:
p∗(i) ≤ P∗(E ∩ F|ti)=





p∗(i) ≥ P∗(E ∩ F|ti)=







i (ti)) ≤ P∗(E ∩ F ∩ τ−1
i (ti)),
p∗(i)P∗(τ−1
i (ti)) ≥ P∗(E ∩ F ∩ τ−1
i (ti)).
Since both P∗ and P∗ are priors and so they are additive, summing the above over ti ∈
τi (F), we have
p∗(i)P∗(F) ≤ P∗(E ∩ F),
p∗(i)P∗(F) ≥ P∗(E ∩ F).
This means that [P∗(E|F),P∗(E|F)] ⊆ ρi(E|ω)f o re v e r yi, so we have established the
result. ¥
This result is an extension of Aumann’s theorem since if Pi is singleton, so is each
ρi (E|ω) and hence
T




i∈I ρi(E|ω)=∅ as a situation where the players completely disagree
about posterior beliefs on E. So the proposition implies that complete disagreement cannot
be common knowledge, and so it has the ﬂavor of Aumann’s theorem: if posteriors are
common knowledge, they must share a posterior belief as one of the posterior beliefs in
ρi(E|ω).
In general, the sets ρi(E|ω), i =1 ,...,I,d i ﬀer from each other, and thus there are
posterior beliefs in their posterior belief sets which do not belong to each others’ posterior
belief set. Consider the example discussed in Subsection 4.1. We have already obtained
ρ1(E|ω)={ε}, ρ2(E|ω)=[ ε/(2 − ε),1]
18for all ω ∈ Ω.T h u s ,ρ1(E|ω)a n dρ2(E|ω)a r ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g ea te v e r yω ∈ Ω. Clearly,
ρ1(E|ω) 6= ρ2(E|ω)a n dρ1(E|ω) ∩ ρ2(E|ω)=ρ1(E|ω).
The problem of “agreeing to disagree” is closely related to various no trade results,
and this issue for multiple prior models is discussed in Kajii and Ui (2004). They present
a framework to understand the possibility of a purely speculative trade under asymmetric
information, where the decision making rule of each trader conforms to the multiple priors
model. In this framework, they derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the sets of
posteriors, thus implicitly on the updating rules adopted by the players, for non-existence
of trade such that it is always common knowledge that every player expects a positive
gain. As a corollary of the main result, they obtain generalization of Proposition 5, which
states that, not only when Pi = Pj for all i,j ∈ I, but also when
T
i∈I Pi 6= ∅, we obtain
T
i∈I ρi(E|ω) 6= ∅. For more details, see Kajii and Ui (2004).
5.3 Complete information games
Consider the special cases where payoﬀ functions are independent of state ω.T h u s s i g -
nals and priors can be seen as external randomization devices. Then our model can be
understood as a complete information game with an external randomization device, but
there is ambiguity about which randomization devices are to be used. Let us relate this
to the studies on generalizations of Nash equilibrium for complete information games,
by allowing uncertainty averse players. These studies include Dow and Werlang (1994),
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Klibanoﬀ (1996), Marinacci (2000), and Lo (1996, 2002).
It can be shown that the mixed equilibrium in our deﬁnition is a correlated equilibrium
under uncertainty in Lo (2002) in general, and when the signals are independent for any
priors, it corresponds to the equilibrium (with agreement) of Lo (1996).
In the studies of the generalized Nash equilibrium, the issue is endogenous formation
of beliefs, accommodating players’ possibly non-additive beliefs on the other’s actions. On
the other hand, in our framework, player’s beliefs about the opponents’ action distributions
are formed from two components: the ﬁrst is about the opponents’ strategic choices of
actions after they have observed signals, and the second is inference about what private
signals the opponents have observed, given the player’s private information. The player’s
beliefs may be non-additive for the second components, but they are additive for the ﬁrst.
So the possibly non-additive part is exogenous in our framework, which makes our model
very tractable to analyze complete information games with uncertainty averse players.
Moreover, there is a conceptual diﬃculty of endogenously formed non-additive beliefs,
in particular in dynamic settings with more than 2 players, that it is not clear how updating
is done. In our setup the updating is controlled exogenously so there will be no conceptual
issues of this kind.
Coming back to the example discussed in Subsection 4.3, Lo (1996) used essentially the
same example to justify why he favors mixed equilibrium over equilibrium in beliefs. One
of the reasons is that an action dominated by a mixed action may survive in equilibrium
in beliefs with uncertainty aversion: a player may form an excessively pessimistic beliefs
about the others’ choices and so he may assign an excessively low value to something
19whose payoﬀs depend on the others’ choices, even if he could perfectly hedge risks had
he not been occupied with an extremely pessimistic view. Also, since the support of a
non-additive measure is not necessarily well deﬁned, the equilibrium in beliefs requires
well deﬁned support by deﬁnition.
However, we do not particularly favor the mixed equilibrium over the equilibrium in
beliefs. First of all, both make good sense. Secondly, it is not necessarily a defect of
the equilibrium concept if a particular player chooses a “dominated” action. In strategic
environments, we are often interested in strategic implications of dominated action to the
other players. Thirdly, in our model, the equilibrium in beliefs do not have this problem
about the support. Roughly speaking, our equilibrium in beliefs can be regarded as a
puriﬁed version of the equilibrium in beliefs ` a la Dow and Werlang (1994), and it is well
behaved.
Since a standard Nash equilibrium is always an equilibrium with uncertainty aversion,
if endogenous formation of non-ad d i t i v eb e l i e f si sc o n s i d e r e d ,t h e r ei sav a s ts e to fe q u i l i b r i a
which including the ones supported by extremely pessimistic expectations of some players.
Therefore, although the generalized Nash equilibrium concepts explain why players may
be stuck in a situation by pessimism, they do not have any stronger predictive power than
the standard Nash equilibrium. In order to be used for economic analysis, one need to
think about “reﬁnements” of those endogenous equilibria, as is done in Marinacci (2000)
for instance, after all.
Our position is that the payoﬀ matrix should be “complete” by itself and it is more
natural to model any extra doubt and ambiguity about how players might have among
themselves as an exogenous state space (and multiple priors) outside the payoﬀ matrix. If
one has to apply an extraneous reﬁnement criteria on “equilibria” aﬀected by ambiguity
anyway, why not describe the ambiguity speciﬁcally in the model.
5.4 Higher order beliefs
One may wonder if the vagueness can still be expressed in a standard Bayesian approach
with a sophisticated higher order knowledge structure. Indeed, the Bayesian framework
turned out to be fruitful, and many aspects of what one might want to attribute to
ambiguity can be simulated by lack of common knowledge of payoﬀs at the level of higher
order beliefs. That is, if action choices of the players are driven by some consideration of
higher order beliefs, one can interpret them as results of ambiguous nature of the game.
For instance, in so called “global games” approach suggested by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), a remotely related piece of information of some type of players has global eﬀect
by iterative dominance argument. This approach has proven to be very eﬀective.10 Also,
Mukerji and Shin (2002) point out, despite only for 2 player games, diﬀerent notions of
equilibrium with non-additive beliefs for complete information games may be reinterpreted
as equilibrium in associated games of incomplete information with a common prior where
the structure of the original game is not common knowledge to various degrees.
10Morris and Shin (1998) is an elegant application. See also an excellent survey by Morris and Shin
(2002).
20We however think that ambiguity and remotely related information should be described
separately, at least at the normative level, and this is our basic motivation. Risk and un-
certainty should yield qualitatively diﬀerent strategic implications in games of incomplete
information, and they do in our model. Although the higher order belief interpretation
may be a good proxy, but by construction the two sources of incompleteness cannot be
distinguished within the standard Bayesian framework.
Also, the higher order belief approach requires a delicate construction of type space in
general. Even in the simple example in the introduction, we need to consider a vast state
space of belief types to express the probability of Investor 1 assigns on the possibility of
Investor 2 might have assigned probability q on state 3, and the probability of Investor 2
knows Investor 1 assigned that way, etc, etc. In our setup we may stick to these 4 intuitive
states. One may ask why think of a black box of multiple priors whose role is not clear,
but we think that the relation between ambiguity and this construction of large type space
is no easier to understand. We contend that our model provides descriptively far simpler
and more useful tool for economic analyses of the role of ambiguity.
We by no means claim that our model is a perfect representation of games with in-
complete information, but we maintain that our model is a tractable and reasonable way
of addressing incomplete information games: when it is diﬃcult to resolve the incomplete-
ness of information by a higher order hierarchy of beliefs types, our recommendation is to
resolve it using multiple priors as we propose, instead of using a complex belief type space
to bury the interesting thought process of the players.
5.5 On ﬁniteness assumptions and generalizations
Let us conclude by mentioning possible generalization of our models. We assumed the
state space and action sets to be ﬁnite sets. But the deﬁn i t i o n so fe q u i l i b r i aw ep r o p o s e d
are very general. For instance, an auction model of Lo (1998) conforms to our model except
for ﬁniteness.11 It is worth pointing out that the so called global games which assumes
an “improper prior” of uniform distribution over the entire real line12 can be readily
interpreted as multiple priors with the ML updating rule in our model. Conceptually,
there is not much reason for using ﬁnite models, and in fact one would need to use inﬁnite
state space to model complex structures of incomplete information.
We chose a ﬁnite model to make the existence results transparent, but more impor-
tantly it is one of purposes that even with a simple ﬁnite model is rich enough to explaining
interesting phenomena. Technically, we are conﬁdent that the existence results can be ex-
tended to allow an inﬁnite state space and inﬁnite actions once we assume strong enough
continuity and compactness. The existence problem for a general inﬁnite state space is
delicate even for Bayesian equilibria, so our model naturally inherits the same diﬃculty,
and in addition, the equicontinuity property of payoﬀ functions indexed by the updated
prior sets (Φi)i∈I is tricky in general spaces.
11In Lo’s model, private signals are assumed to be independent, which makes his model very tractable.
12See a survey by Morris and Shin (2002).
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